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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Sec. 78-
28-2(h) (1986). Memmott (hereinafter "Memmott") appeals the 
findings and judgment rendered by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, to wit: 
1. Memmott entered into a written contract with EWP 
pursuant to which EWP was to provide certain surveying and 
related services and Memmott was to compensate EWP 
therefore; 
2. EWP substantially performed its services under said 
contract; 
3. Memmott materially breached his contract with EWP 
by failing and refusing to compensate EWP as agreed and must 
pay damages of $6,000 plus interest, costs, and attorneys 
fees; 
4. The other named defendants are not liable to EWP on 
the subject debt. 
Copies of the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment are attached 
hereto as Appendices A through C, respectively. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a copy of the contract 
between EWP and Memmott, properly admitted in to evidence. 
2. Has Memmott marshalled all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
3. Has Memmott considered the evidence which supports the 
trial court's findings of fact in a light most favorable to those 
findings. 
4. Has Memmott demonstrated that the trial court's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous. 
5. Is Memmott's appeal regarding the liability of his co-
defendants properly before this Court. 
6. Did Memmott have actual or apparent authority to enter 
into a contract with EWP on behalf of all of the defendants. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Annotated Sect 78-25-16 (1953): 
Parole Evidence of Contents of Writings-When Admissible. There 
can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the 
writing itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in which 
case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made, 
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it 
after reasonable notice. 
(3) When the original is a record or other document in the 
custody of a public officer. 
(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record or 
a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other 
statute. 
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or 
other documents which cannot be examined in Court without great 
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the 
general result of the whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a 
profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, 
in the regular course of business or activity has kept or 
recorded any memorandum, writing> entry, print, representation or 
combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or 
event, and in the regular course of business is caused any or all 
of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any 
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photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature 
photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or 
forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the 
original may be destroyed in the regular course of business 
unless its preservation is required by law; and such 
reproduction, was satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in 
evidence as the original itself and any judicial or 
administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or 
not, and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is 
likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is 
in existence and available for inspection under direction of 
Court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or 
facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4) , a copy 
of the original, or of the record, must be produced; and those 
mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2) , either a copy of oral 
evidence of the contents. 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1002: 
Requirement of Original. To prove the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, 
recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise 
provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of this state or by statute. 
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3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1003: 
Admissibility of Duplicates. A duplicate is admissible to 
the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is 
raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the 
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu 
of the original. 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1004: 
Admissibility of Other Evidence and Contents. The original 
is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, 
recording, or photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Original is lost or destroyed. All originals are lost 
or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed 
them in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained 
by any available judicial process or procedure; or 
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an 
original was under the control of the party against whom offered, 
he was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the 
content would be a subject of proof at the hearing and he does 
not produce the original at the hearing; or 
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or 
photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue. 
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5. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) (1987): 
Findings by the Court, (a) Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient 
if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in 
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
EWP initiated litigation against Memmott, et al. for, inter 
alia, breach of written contract arising out of the defendants7 
failure to compensate EWP for surveying and related services 
provided under said contract. EWP's services were provided to 
assist Memmott, et al. in severance proceedings involving U.S. 
Interstate 15 and mining claims jointly owned by the named 
defendants. Memmott, et al. defended on the basis that EWP had 
charged more than agreed for its services, that they had not 
signed the contract, and/or that the services provided by EWP 
were neither what was requested nor what was needed. 
Trial was had January 6,1987, before the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding Sr., sitting without a jury, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Juab County, State of Utah. EWP appeared through 
its duly authorized representative, Ralph E. Watson, and with 
counsel. Memmott and co-defendants Delbert Crapo and Sandra 
Memmott appeared with counsel. No other co-defendants appeared. 
Following trial on the merits, the Court rendered judgment in 
favor of EWP against Memmott. True and correct copies of the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision, Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment, are appended hereto as 
Appendices A through C. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The named defendants jointly own 52 or more placer 
mining claims located in Juab and/or Millard Counties, State of 
Utah. (Transcript: pgs. 13, 28, 29, 129, 159) 
2. U.S. Interstate 15 (1-15) crosses over some of the 
defendants' mining claims. (Transcript: pgs. 13, 24) 
3. Because of the overlap of 1-15 and the subject mining 
claims, the defendants were involved in severance proceedings 
with the State of Utah. (Transcript: pgs. 14-16, 26-28) 
4. Memmott and Delbert Crapo approached EWP in September of 
1983 to discuss surveying services to be provided by EWP to 
assist Memmott and Crapo in the proceedings. (Transcript: pgs. 
21, 24, 35, 64) 
5. EWP's services were initiated in the field on October 
17, 1983. (Transcript: pgs. 44, 67) 
6. At the end of the work day on October 17, 1983, Memmott 
signed a document, the identity and contents of which were at 
issue at trial. (Transcript: pgs. 20, 39, 62-63) 
7. Memmott identified the document he signed as "standard 
work authorization" which authorized EWP to survey the ground 
and/or allowed EWP to avoid trespass claims and described the 
document as a blank sheet of paper containing only his signature 
and the date. Said document was from a pad of such forms 
possessed by Ralph Watson (Watson) of EWP. (Transcript: pgs. 
39, 147) 
8. EWP claimed that the document Memmott signed was the 
8 
standard form contract used by EWP with its clients and was in 
fact the only such form used by EWP. (Transcript: pgs. 46, 59-
60; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (Appendix D)) 
9. EWP does not use a form such as that described by 
Memmott. (Transcript: pgs. 194-195) 
10. Watson completed the contract for Memmott's signature 
while riding in EWP's survey vehicle with Doug Grimshaw 
(Grimshaw) on the way from Levan, Utah to the job-site on October 
17, 1983. Watson and Grimshaw discussed the need to have Memmott 
sign the contract that day. (Transcript: pgs. 46-47, 49-50, 62-
63) 
11. Memmott's signature appears in the bottom left-hand 
corner of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. (Transcript: pg. 33) 
12. EWP's standard practice was to retain the original of 
contracts with clients and to mail a copy of the same to the 
client. (Transcript: pgs. 59-60) 
13. EWP was unable to produce the original of the contract 
at trial. EWP made a thorough and diligent search of its files 
in an attempt to locate the original but was unsuccessful. EWP 
found a copy of the document in the Memmott project file. 
(Transcript: pgs. 60-61) 
14. On September 30, 1986, EWP notified Memmott, et al. 
that the contents of the contract would be the subject of proof 
at trial and that a copy of the same would be used for such 
purposes. (Fourth District Court, Juab County, Civil No. 5891; 
Pleading entitled "Notice") 
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15. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was offered and accepted into 
evidence by the Court over Memmott, et al.'s objections. 
(Transcript: pg. 63) 
16. The UDOT strip map was based upon a survey utilizing 
the State Plane Coordinate System and the mining claims were 
located according to a survey coordinate system established by 
the GLO, which systems are wholly independent. 
17. Memmott either showed or directed EWP to the location 
of several GLO section corners in the project area. (Transcript: 
pgs. 49, 101) 
18. EWP found some ten or twelve GLO section corners in the 
field. (Transcript: pg. 49) 
19. Two or more of the GLO section corners referred to by 
Memmott had been destroyed by the construction of 1-15. 
(Transcript: pgs. 52, 102) 
20. Of the ten or twelve GLO section corners located, EWP 
used approximately one-half in its survey. (Transcript: pgs. 
52, 102) 
21. Of the five or six GLO section corners used in the EWP 
survey, the UDOT right-of-way survey tied into only two such 
corners. (Transcript: pgs. 104-105, 111) 
22. EWP's field effort totalled 25 1/2 hours of surveying 
and related travel plus expenses. (Transcript: pgs. 44-45, 67) 
23. EWP provided three separate items of information: 
a. The GLO map reflecting the location of the mining 
claims and the centerline for 1-15; 
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b. The 1-15 UDOT strip map reflecting the highway 
right-of-way as-designed versus the location of the twelve 
affected claims; 
c. A plat or map reflecting the two points where UDOT 
had tied their survey into the GLO coordinate system. This 
plat further reflected the discrepancies between 1-15 as 
designed (as per the right-of-way strip map) and as-built. 
(Transcript: Pgs. 70-78, 129) 
24. Memmott claims that the information provided by EWP was 
useless for purposes of the severance hearing. (Transcript: 140-
145) 
25. Prior to retaining EWP, Memmott and Delbert Crapo had 
requested the same services and received comparable information 
from two other surveying firms. (Transcript: Pgs. 11-12, 30) 
26. Memmott has never tried to use the information provided 
by EWP in the severance proceedings and does not know whether 
such information was sufficient for such purposes. (Transcript: 
Pg. 155) 
27. Memmott admits that EWP is owed compensation for its 
services but contests the amount claimed by EWP. (Transcript: 
pgs. 156-157) 
29. The additional information which Memmott contends was 
required but was not provided would have given only the as-built 
location of 1-15 versus the mining claims where GLO section lines 
cross the right-of-way and would have indicated nothing with 
respect to the location of 1-15 and the mining claims between the 
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section lines• (Transcript: pgs. 185-188) 
30. The effort required to provide an as-built survey for 
the length of 1-15 as it affects the subject mining claims was 
considerably more expensive than as requested by Memmott. 
(Transcript: pgs. 135, 185-188) 
31. EWP reflected bearings and distances along GLO section 
lines to the 1-15 right-of-way as-built at the two places where 
UDOT had made the same tie in surveying for the right-of-way 
strip map because they were the only instances where a useful 
comparison could be made between 1-15 as-built and as-designed. 
(Transcript: pgs. 123) 
32. Memmott and Delbert Crapo did not have actual authority 
to contract with EWP on behalf of the other co-defendants. 
(Transcript: pgs. 37-38) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court properly admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
into evidence in that the same constituted other and secondary 
evidence of the contract between EWP and Memmott. EWP 
established that, more probably than not, the original had either 
been lost, destroyed or was in the possession of Memmott and that 
the copy was otherwise authentic. EWP further gave due notice to 
Memmott that it intended to make a copy of the contract the 
subject of proof at trial. 
II. Memmott has failed to sustain his burden on appeal in 
that he has failed to marshall all of the evidence which supports 
the trial court's findings and has failed to establish that such 
findings were clearly erroneous (i.e. , that the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings was insufficient to support 
said findings when viewed in a light most favorable thereto. 
III. Memmott's appeal of the trial court's findings that 
the co-defendants are not liable to EWP and/or that there was no 
evidence that they were responsible to Memmott for contribution 
may not be properly before this Court and/or may be without 
merit. Memmott did not and has not made any cross-claims against 
his co-defendants for contribution or otherwise. The evidence at 
trial indicated that Memmott had no actual authority to represent 
his co-defendants in dealing with EWP; nor was there any evidence 
that Memmott and the co-defendants were engaged in joint 
operation of the subject mining claims giving arise to a claim of 
apparent authority. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, A COPY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN EWP 
AND MEMMOTT, WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Memmott challenges the propriety of the trial court's 
admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 (Appendix D) was a photocopy of the EWP form contract 
signed by Memmott. Memmott challenged its admission on the basis 
that the exhibit was not the original of the contract. 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the general rule is that 
the original contract is required to prove the content of that 
contract. Utah R. Evid. 1002. However, this rule is expressly 
subject to certain exceptions, id. For example, a duplicate is 
admissible to the same extent as an original except where there 
is a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original or 
admission of a duplicate on the same footing as an original would 
be unfair under the circumstances. id. , 1003. Thus, in some 
instances (as in the case at bar) a duplicate is not admissible 
to the same extent as an original. This does not mean however 
that a duplicate is not admissible. To be sure, an original is 
not required and other evidence of its contents is admissible if, 
inter alia, the original has been lost or destroyed or is in the 
possession of the opponent against whom it is offered. Id., 1004; 
UTAH CODE ANN. Sect. 78-25-16 (1953). 
Rules 1002-1004 and Sect. 78-25-16 are essentially 
codifications of the "best evidence rule" and its exceptions. 
Caselaw interpreting both the codified and common law rules are 
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unanimous in their declaration that other or secondary evidence 
is admissable upon an adequate showing that the "best" evidence 
can't be found. Meyer v. General American Corp. , 569 P.2d 1094 
(Utah 1977); see, also, Amoco Production Co. v. United States. 
455 F. Supp 46 (D.C Utah 1977); Idaho First National Bank v. 
Wells. 596 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1979). EWP submits that it made such 
a showing at trial. 
In its effort to have a copy of the contract admitted into 
evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, EWP went to great lengths to 
establish the authenticity of the exhibit. For example: 
1. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is a sample of the only form 
contract used by EWP with its clients. 
2. Watson prepared the original of Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 for Memmott's signature in the presence of Grimshaw. 
3. Watson and Grimshaw discussed the need to have 
Memmott sign the contract on October 17, 1983. 
4. Watson saw Memmott sign the contract on October 17, 
1983. 
5. Memmott signed a document on October 17, 1983. 
6. The signature which appears in the bottom left-hand 
corner of the front page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is in fact 
a true and correct copy of Memmott's signature. 
Watson further provided a detailed explanation as to why the 
original was not to be found, including EWP's normal office 
procedure for the handling of original contracts, where that 
procedure might have broken down in this instance, the efforts 
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undertaken by EWP to find the original of the contract and, 
finally, where Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was ultimately found, EWP 
also duly and timely notified Memmott that the copy of the 
contract would be the subject of proof at trial as required by 
Rule 1004(3)• 
Memmott argued that admission of the evidence under the 
circumstances was unfair. In support of this argument, Memmott 
claims that he did not sign Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; yet he has 
never explained how his signature got there. He did admit 
signing a document which, as per Memmott's testimony, granted 
permission to EWP to survey the property; yet the document 
described (i.e., an otherwise blank sheet of paper with nothing 
on it other than Memmott's signature and the date) could hardly 
be interpreted as granting EWP authority to survey the property. 
Memmott has not even produced the document he purportedly signed. 
Memmott contends that the document he signed was a standard work 
authorization form from a pad possessed by Watson; yet Watson and 
Grimshaw testified that EWP uses only one form contract and that 
was the type found in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Finally, Memmott 
argues that admission was improper because EWP did not offer any 
testimony as to what terms were in the agreement; apparently 
ignoring basic axioms of the law that a document speaks for 
itself and a copy is the best secondary evidence of the contents 
of a document. In short, the factual support for the trial 
court's admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence is not 
only substantial and competent, it is infinitely more reliable 
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than that offered by Memmott against such admission. 
Accordingly, the trial court's admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
was proper, 
II. MEMMOTT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN ON APPEAL. 
Memmott assails the findings of the trial court on the 
ground that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support 
said findings. The challenge is raised on two fronts, to wit: 
1) that Memmott signed Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; and 2) that EWP 
substantially performed its obligations under its agreement with 
Memmott. 
Appellate court review of a trial court's findings of fact 
is governed by Rule 52(a), U.R.Civ.P. (amended 1987), which, in 
its pertinent parts, reads as follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A ... Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, [emphasis added] 
To establish that the trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous, it is necessary for the appellant to: 
[M]arshall all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and to then demonstrate that even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the factual 
determinations made by trial court, that the evidence is 
insufficient to support its findings. 
Harline v. Campbel 1, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986); see also, 
Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 P.2d 
301 (Utah App. 1987). 
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In short, Memmott must accomplish three things to be 
successful in challenging the findings of the trial court based 
upon insufficiency of the evidence, to wit: 
1. Marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings; 
2. Review all such evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings; and, 
3. Demonstrate that all such evidence, when viewed in such 
a light, is insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings. 
EWP submits that Memmott has failed to sustain his burden on all 
three counts, 
A. Memmott has failed to marshal all of the evidence which 
supports the trial court's findings. 
Memmott's threshhold burden in challenging the trial court's 
findings is to marshal all of the evidence in support of those 
findings, EWP submits that Memmott has utterly failed to sustain 
this burden. To be sure, Memmott has marshalled only the 
evidence that Memmott himself concludes was "presumably relied 
upon" by the trial court in support of its findings. 
(Appellant's Brief: pg. 11) Memmott's selective approach is 
further reflected in his brief wherein he concludes that the 
trial court's evidentiary basis "appear[s]" to be based upon 
certain selected exhibits "among other items" and "primarily" the 
testimony of EWP's Ralph Watson. (id.) 
That Memmott's selective approach to marshalling the 
evidence is one of convenience, if not necessity, becomes obvious 
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upon an examination of the evidence which Memmott has ignored in 
his appeal. For example, in his challenge to the court's finding 
that he signed the EWP form contract, Memmott does not mention 
that: 
1. On the way to the job site on October 17, 1983, 
Watson prepared the contract for Memmott's signature and 
asked Grimshaw to remind him to have Memmott sign the 
contract that day. 
2. The contract signed by Memmott was the only form 
contract or authorization used by EWP. 
3. The signature which appears in the bottom left-
hand corner of the front-page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is in 
fact a true and correct copy of Memmott's signature. 
These facts are clearly supportive of the trial court's finding 
that Memmott signed the EWP form contract; yet they are ignored 
by Memmott in his appeal. 
Similarly, in his challenge to the trial court's finding 
that EWP substantially performed its contract, Memmott fails to 
mention that: 
1. Memmott and Crapo had previously asked two other 
surveying firms to provide the same service as was requested 
of EWP and these firms provided essentially the same work 
product as was provided by EWP. 
2. Memmott never tried to use the information provided 
by EWP in the severance hearing and in fact does not know 
whether it was sufficient for that purpose. 
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3. Memmott admits that EWP is owed money for its 
services and his dispute, at least initially, was not as to 
the existence of the debt, but rather as to the amount. 
4. The information provided by EWP to Memmott did 
reflect, inter alia, the location of the twelve impacted 
mining claims versus the 1-15 right-of-way as shown on the 
UDOT strip maps and, further, compared the location of 1-15 
as-designed versus as-built at the only two points where 
UDOT had tied into the same survey coordinate system used in 
locating the mining claims. 
5. The additional information which Memmott contends 
was required but was not provided would have given only the 
as-built location of 1-15 versus the mining claims where GLO 
section lines cross the right-of-way and would have 
indicated nothing with respect to the location of 1-15 and 
the mining claims between the section lines. 
6. The effort required to provide an as-built survey 
of 1-15 versus the location of the mining claims for the 
entire length of the pertinent sections of 1-15 would have 
required a much more expensive effort than that which was 
requested by Memmott. 
(These are but some of the facts which Memmott fails to consider 
in this appeal; still others appear under sub-point B. which 
follows.) 
The import of these facts on the trial court's findings can 
scarcely be overstated. Memmott and Crapo claimed that EWP did 
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not provide the information they requested,; yet by their own 
testimony they had, previous to contacting EWP, made the same 
request of two other surveying firms and received information 
effectively identical to that provided by EWP. Not only did this 
confirm that Memmott had received that which he had requested, it 
confirmed EWP's contention that the services provided by EWP were 
consistent with accepted surveying practice and its limitations. 
Memmott, et al. also argued that the information EWP provided was 
useless in the severance hearing; yet they never tried to use it 
in the hearing. In fact, the only competent evidence is that the 
information was adequate for this purpose and the trial court so 
concluded. 
By ignoring crucial evidence which clearly supports the 
trial court's findings, Memmott has failed to meet his "threshold 
burden on appeal, one that is neither elective nor optional." 
Fitzgerald, supra at 16. And this Court will not do Memmott7s 
job for him. id. Under these circumstances, this Court can reach 
but one conclusion: that the findings of the trial court were 
not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed. Ashton, supra. 
B. Memmott has failed to consider the evidence which 
supports the trial court's findings in a light most 
favorable to those findings. 
As previously noted, Memmott has failed to marshal all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. However, 
assuming arguendo that Memmott has sustained this threshhold 
burden, he has nonetheless failed to sustain yet another aspect 
of his burden on appeal. Specifically, Memmott has failed to 
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discuss the evidence in support of the trial court's findings in 
a light most favorable to those findings. 
Of the facts which Memmott chose to discuss on appeal and 
which support the trial court's findings, Memmott has nonetheless 
misinterpreted and/or quoted many out of context in an effort to 
lend support to his own version of the facts, as opposed to how 
they were found by the trial court. For example: 
1. Memmott contends that the number of GLO section 
monuments "that had been identified and shown EWP was in 
excess of twelve", (Appellant's Brief: Pg. 9) In fact, 
EWP was either shown or directed to some GLO corners, of 
which it was able locate some "ten or twelve." Two or more 
of the GLO section corners which Memmott said existed had in 
fact been destroyed during the construction of 1-15. 
2. Memmott also attempts to use the language quoted 
in item 1. to imply that the number of ties EWP should have 
made to the mining claims should equal the number of GLO 
section corners located. In fact, of the "ten or twelve" 
GLO section corners which were actually found, EWP felt only 
five or six were possibly useful in its effort to obtain 
surveying information. 
3. Of the five or six GLO section corners which EWP 
utilized in its surveying effort, the UDOT survey for 1-15 
had been tied into only two. 
4. Memmott supposedly signed a "standard work 
authorization" provided by Watson granting EWP the authority 
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to perform the survey and/or avoid trespass claims; yet 
Memmott described a document that was blank, save for his 
signature and the date. 
5. Memmott states that "EWP's survey crew spent two 
days surveying in the field", the implication being that a 
normal eight-hour work day was involved. (Appellant's Brief: 
pg. 8) In fact, EWP spent twenty-five and one-half (25-1/2) 
hours over two days in the field. 
6. Memmott states that EWP's services could have been 
provided a third of the cost (Appellant's Brief: pg. 14) ; 
yet the trial court specifically found that EWP's charges 
were reasonable. 
7. Memmott argues "it is also clear that only Mr. 
Watson saw Mr. Ralph Memmott sign anything despite Mr. 
Watson, Mr. Grimshaw, Mr. Crapo and Ms. Memmott all being 
present at the time." (Appellant's Brief: Pg. 16) In 
fact, Memmott admits to signing something, if not 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Furthermore, Delbert Crapo 
testified, or at least implied in his testimony, that 
Memmott signed "the blank work order sheet ... ." 
(Transcript: Pg. 20) Finally, although Crapo, Grimshaw and 
Ms. Memmott were also on site the day the contract was 
signed, the evidence suggests that only Memmott and Watson 
» 
were in a position to testify as to what was actually 
signed. (Transcript: pg. 118) 
These are but a few examples of where Memmott has failed to 
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discuss the evidence which supports the trial court's findings in 
the manner required by law. Indeed, he has again ignored a 
substantial portion of this evidence. 
EWP submits that Memmott's selective use and interpretation 
of the evidence given at trial does not rise to the level of 
viewing the evidence which supports the trial court's findings in 
a light most favorable to those findings. He has done nothing 
more than present and argue his version of the facts. Because he 
has failed to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings, Memmott's appeal must fail. Harline; 
Ashton; Scharf; Fitzgerald, supra. 
C. Memmott has failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
Again, assuming arguendo that Memmott has marshalled all of 
the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings and that he 
has addressed such evidence in a light most favorable to those 
findings, he has nonetheless failed to demonstrate that such 
evidence was insufficient to support those findings and that, 
accordingly, the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
By way of example, consider Memmott's challenge to the trial 
court's findings that he signed the EWP form contract. There is 
ample evidence in the record to suggest that he did in fact sign 
that document. Most telling is the fact that his signature 
appears on et copy of the contract. Despite such evidence, he 
contended that he did not sign that document; yet he offered no 
explanation as to how his signature got there, he did not produce 
the document he says he signed, nor did he convince anyone, let 
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alone the trial court, that a blank sheet of paper with his 
signature on it constitutes an authorization to survey property. 
Consider also Memmott's challenge to the trial court's 
findings that EWP substantially performed its contract. Memmott 
requested and received virtually identical services and 
information from three different surveying firms, including EWP; 
yet his defense was, inter alia, that he did not receive what he 
requested. He argued that the information EWP provided was 
useless; yet he never tried to use it. As previously noted, 
there is no competent evidence that that information was anything 
but sufficient for the severance hearings. 
Memmott has simply failed to demonstrate that the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings is insufficient and, as 
such, that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
What Memmott has demonstrated, if nothing else, is that there was 
a conflict in the evidence at trial. Conflicts in the evidence 
are not sufficient to disturb the findings of the trier-of-fact 
as this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. Rule 52(a), supra.; Chandler vs. Mathews, 734 P.2d 
907 (Utah 1987); Circle Air Freight vs. Boyce Equipment, 745 P.2d 
828 (Utah App. 1987); Gillmor vs. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461 (Utah 
App. 1987). In short, Memmott has failed to sustain the third 
aspect of his burden on appeal and his appeal, therefor, must 
fail. Harline; Ashton; Scharf; Fitzgerald; supra. 
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III. MEMMOTT'S APPEAL REGARDING THE LIABILITY OF THE CO-
DEFENDANTS MAY NOT BE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND/OR MAY 
BE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Memmott contends that the trial court erred in concluding 
that his co-defendants were not directly liable to EWP on the 
debt and that there was no evidence that they were liable to 
Memmott in contribution. EWP believes that Memmott's co-
defendants are in fact liable to EWP for the services rendered by 
EWP and attempted to establish this point at trial. However, the 
trial court concluded otherwise. 
EWP does not oppose Memmott's appeal on this point. If in 
fact Memmott's current counsel continues to represent the 
remaining co-defendants, as he did at trial, EWP would be 
willing to stipulate to an amendment of judgment making the 
remaining co-defendants liable to EWP (if in fact this 
alternative is available). A second alternative under this 
scenario would be for the judgment of the trial court to be 
reversed on this point by the Court and remanded to the trial 
court for a decision consistent with the Court's ruling. 
Regardless of whether Memmott7s current counsel continues to 
represent Memmott's co-defendants, EWP must confess that it does 
not believe that this aspect of the appeal is properly before 
this Court. Memmott did not make any cross-claim against his co-
defendants at trial. To be sure, the defense of all co-
defendants against EWP's claims were initiated, prosecuted, and 
concluded as a single effort. Under such circumstances it is 
inconceivable as to how apparently new claims could become a 
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matter for appeal. 
Finally, Memmott testified at trial that he had no actual 
authority to represent anyone other than himself in his dealings 
with EWP. Defense counsel at trial echoed this position in 
closing argument. Memmott has apparently changed his tune and is 
now apparently attempting to backdoor the issue under the guise 
of apparent authority by claiming that there was a mining 
partnership. As Memmott duly notes in his argument, joint 
operation is a prerequisite to a finding of a mining partnership. 
Mud Control Laboratories vs. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 2 Utah 2d 85 
(Utah 1954). However, there was absolutely no evidence 
introduced at trial that Memmott and his co-defendants were 
engaged in both the joint ownership and operation of the subject 
mining claims. Without joint operation, there is no mining 
partnership; and without a mining partnership, there can be no 
apparent authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly admitted Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as 
other evidence of the contract between EWP and Memmott. Memmott 
has failed to sustain his burden on appeal. He has failed to 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings; he has failed to review such evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings; and, he has failed to 
demonstrate that such evidence, when viewed in such a light, was 
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insufficient to support such findings such that said findings 
were clearly erroneous. Memmott's appeal regarding the liability 
of co-defendants is not properly before this Court and is 
otherwise without merit. 
EWP repectfully requests that Memmott's appeal be dismissed, 
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed, and that EWP be 
awarded costs and attorney's fees on appeal and/or that the 
matter be remanded to the trial court for determination and award 
of attorneys fees. 
REPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2* * day of r^cUs*** 7^  
19 e g , 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * • • • • • 
ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON & 
PREATOR, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH MEMMOTT, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case Number 5891 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
******** 
This matter came before the court for trial on January 
6, 1987, in Juab County. Plaintiff was present and represented 
by its attorney, Craig C. Coburn. Defendants were present and 
represented by their attorney, Gregory M. Holbrook. The court 
having heard evidence, reviewed the exhibits and having taken the 
matter under advisement now enters its: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiff shall hereafter for simplicity be 
referred to as EWP. The defendant Ralph Memmott entered into an 
agreement with EWP on the 17th of October, 1983, wherein EWP 
would provide certain survey and engineering services to the 
defendants and the defendants agreed to pay an estimated fee of 
$6,000.00. The court expressly finds that Mr. Ralph Memmott 
entered into said agreement individually and there was no 
evidence introduced that his signing of the written agreement was 
other than in his own behalf. Whether he has arrangements with 
the other property owners for contribution is not in evidence. 
The court finds that the plaintiff substantially performed the 
service contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of 
that estimated and that such expenditures were reasonable. EWP 
has provided all existing survey ties, location of defendants1 
mining claims in relationship to the interstate highway as 
indicated on the Department of Transportation's highway strip 
maps and further provided the defendant with a GLO map showing 
the location of the interstate highway as it related to the 
defendants' claims. Such survey work and office work as was 
performed by the defendant and the resulting work product was 
sufficient to substantially comply with the intent of the parties 
and to satisfy the needs of the defendants. 
The court expressly finds that there is no evidence 
that the other named defendants have any liability under the 
complaint or the agreement entered into by Mr. Memmott with the 
plaintiff, and therefore the complaint is dismissed as to those 
other named parties. 
The plaintiff in its complaint having prayed for 
$6,000.00 only, judgment is granted on plaintiff's second cause 
of action in the sum of $6,000.00. 
The court further awards interest at the rate of 18% 
per annum until entry of judgment from October 29, 1984. This 
date of commencement of interest is in accordance with Mr. 
Watson's testimony as to the commencement of that interest. 
There being no evidence as to attorneys' fees, no 
attorneys' fees are awarded. Plaintiff is awarded costs of 
court. A cost bill to be entered in accordance with Rule 54(d) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Attorney for the plaintiff to prepare appropriate 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and submit the 
same to defendant for approval as to form prior to submission to 
the court for signature. / 
DATED this o day of Japdar 
cc: Gregory M. Holbrook 
Craig C. Coburn 
APPENDIX B 
CRAIG C. COBURN #0688 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTATH 
ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON AND ) 
PREATOR ENGINEERING, INC., ] 
dba Eckhoff, Watson and ] 
Preator Engineering, a Utah 
corporation, ! 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
RALPH MEMMOTT, GRACE MEMMOTT, 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, SUE MEMMOTT, ] 
DELBERT CRAPO, SYRELDA CRAPO, ] 
TRENT CRAPO and KENT CRAPO, 
Defendants. ] 
I AMENDED 
' FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 5891 
i Hon. Ray M. Harding 
This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of January, 
1987, before the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Plaintiff appearing 
in person together with its attorney, Craig C. Coburn, and 
Defendants Ralph Memmott, Delbert Crapo and Susan Memmott 
appearing in person and together with their attorney, Gregory M. 
Holbrook, and witnesses having been sworn and testified and 
evidence taken and the Court being fully apprised in the 
premises, does hereby enter the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on October 17, 1983, Plaintiff and Defendant Ralph 
Memmott entered into a written contract whereby Plaintiff was to 
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provide certain surveying services to Defendant and Defendant 
agreed to pay an estimated fee of $6,000.00. 
2. Defendant Ralph Memmott entered into said agreement 
individually and not for and on behalf of any of the other named 
Defendants. 
3. There is no evidence that Defendant Ralph Memmott had 
arrangements with the other property owners for contribution for 
Plaintiff's services. 
4. Plaintiff substantially performed the services 
contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of that 
estimated and such expenditures were reasonable. Plaintiff 
further provided all existing survey ties, location of 
Defendant's mine claims or relationship to the interstate highway 
as indicated on the Department of Transportation's highway strip 
maps and further provided said Defendant witht a GLO map showing 
the location of the interstate highway as it related to the 
Defendant's claims. Such survey work and office work as was 
performed by Plaintiff and the resulting work product was 
sufficient to substantially comply with the intent of the parties 
and to satisfy the needs of the Defendants. 
5. Defendant Ralph Memmott failed and refused to compensate 
Plaintiff as agreed. 
6. The contract in question provided for interest to be 
paid on all past due amounts at the rate of eighteen percent 
(18%) per annum. 
7. The contract provided that in the event it became 
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necessary for Plaintiff to retain an attorney to collect under 
the contract, all costs of collection, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, were to be paid by Defendant Ralph Memmott. 
8. Defendant Ralph Memmott's obligation to compensate 
Plaintiff became past due on October 29, 1984. 
9. Plaintiff incurred $2,500.00 in attorney's fees in this 
matter exclusive of court costs. 
10. There is no evidence that the other named Defendants 
have any liability under the Complaint or the subject contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there existed a valid and enforceable contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant Ralph Memmott. 
2. That Plaintiff substantially performed its obligations 
under said contract. 
3. That Defendant Ralph Memmott breached his obligations 
under said contract. 
4. That as a direct and proximate result of said breach, 
Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $6,000.00, and is 
entitled to Judgment in said amount. 
5. That pursuant to said contract, Plaintiff is further 
entitled to interest on said amount calculated at eighteen 
percent (18%) per annum from and after October 29, 1984 through 
date of Judgment. 
6. That pursuant to said contract, Plaintiff is entitled to 
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500.00. 
7. That Plaintiff is further entitled to Judgment 
representing court costs of $54.50 incurred in this matter. 
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8. Plaintiff has no cause of action against the remaining 
named Defendants in thLs matter. 
DATED this ~^5 aay Qf _ 
CC3/EWP/FF 
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APPENDIX C 
CRAIG C. COBURN #0688 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTATH 
ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON AND 
PREATOR ENGINEERING, INC., 
dba Eckhoff, Watson and 
Preator Engineering, a Utah 
corporation, ' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
RALPH MEMMOTT, GRACE MEMMOTT, 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, SUE MEMMOTT, 
DELBERT CRAPO, SYRELDA CRAPO, 
TRENT CRAPO and KENT CRAPO, 
Defendants. 
1 AMENDED JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 5891 
i Hon. Ray M. Harding 
This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of January, 
1987, before the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Plaintiff appearing 
in person together with its attorney, Craig C. Coburn, and 
Defendants Ralph Memmott, Delbert Crapo and Susan Memmott 
appearing in person and together with their attorney, Gregory M. 
Holbrook, and witnesses having been sworn and testified and 
evidence taken and the Court being fully apprised in • the 
premises, and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Plaintiff have judgment against Defendant Ralph 
Memmott in the principle amount of $6,000,00, plus interest 
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thereon from and after October 29, 1984 through date of Judgment 
at eighteen percent (18%) per annum ($2,96 per diem), attorney's 
fees of $2,500.00, and court costs of $54.50, plus interest 
thereon at the highest rate provided by law. 
2. That Plaintiff's Complaint as against all other named 
Defendants is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this J & ^ ^ a y of rfjK^d , 19 Q / . 
BY THE COURT: 
CC3/EWP/JUDG 
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APPENDIX D 
Eckhoff, Watson and Preatortngineering ' C I \ 
580 North Main Street ^ 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 Date: /QrA Z./4&*> 
Phone: (801) 586-3004 Job No. 
Pa/nh /YJAmjO^tf' . hereinafter CLIENT, a(n) ; 
does/hereby authorize ECXKOFF, WATSON AND PREATOR ENGINEERING, hereinafter ENGINEER, 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, to perform t 
services set forth below, subject to the terms and conditions set forth below and on t 
reverse side hereof. r^
 /f / -
A. Client ^ Information (complete^ all items): 7?# i r £ra./C>c> 
Name £ * / o / j tWtwMefr 7V*> - f^ZZ-
Representative Phone 74<j -.T^^C 
Address Sx^g*"^. ^^>70 g , R O. P>er*. 6,&**> f)^p3cX. ?j</-Jj//2 
City fi//mg^T ' State u.-^U^ & Zip < ; ^ £ 3 / 
Owner of Property Involved 
Credit References . 
B. Project Description (attach Schedule if necessary): 
Project Hamed/a,^ /ocjuf/£m rtod&>cL4s /AtyftA* Client PO No. 
Location jJcjUr S^it>in
 / Uh^U ' ' 
Estimated Completion Date: ^ £(AC'J~ 
Description of ENGINEER'S Services: J ^ g f ^ */L'VHM^ 0J*t«\ s>*t MO/)S+ 
1 1
 111 I I I , II I 1 , 1 
C. Compensation: 
1. Basis (check and complete one (1)): 
Salary Cost and Reimbursable Expenses times multipliers. 
Salary Cost Multiplier: .3,2. Est. Fee: $ s5£&Q^ 
Reimbursable Expenses Multiplier: /./5 
o Lump Sum With Progress Payments (attach Schedule). 
o Cost Plus Fixed Fee With Progress Payments (attach Schedule). 
o Percentage of Construction Cost With Progress Payments (attach Schedule) 
2. CLIENT shall pay a retainage fee of $ , which fee shall be paid in fu 
prior to commencement of the work herein contemplated. Said fee shall 1 
applied to -CLIENT'S final payment for the services provided hereunde 
D. CLIENT has read'and understood the terms and conditions set forth on the reverse si< 
hereof and agrees N "that such items are hereby incorporated into and made a part i 
this agreement. : 
E. Having read, understood and agreed to the foregoing, CLIENT and ENGINEER, by ai 
through their authorized representatives, have subscribed their names here< 
effective the day of , 19 . 
CLIEOT ECKHOFF, WATSON AND PREATOR ENGINEERING 
*4s tcL—^Jt 
Date: /Ci^/7/^L 
(GP\Z\*P^ ll/a\Z&2 
AKTICLF 1.UKF1NIT10NS 
1.1 Salary Cost 
Ttie direct payroll expense for each employee engaged on the Project (computed by dividing 
the annual pay/ell cost ( i . e . , annual wages or salary) for such employee by 1868 hours). 
Multiplied by LIS to cover payroll taxes and insurance incident to employment, multi-
plied by the number of hours worled by such employee on the Project. The direct payroll 
expense for overtime hours worked by an employee on the Project shall be multiplied by 
1.72S ( i . e . , l .S x 1 . IS) , provided that CLIENT has authorized such overtime. 
1.2 Reimbursable Expenses 
Expenditures made By the ENGINEER, i t s employees or i t s consultants in the interest of 
the Project. Reimbursable Expenses include out are not limited to: 
1.2.1 Expense of transportation, subsistence and lodging when traveling in connection 
with the Project. 
1.2.2 Expense of long distance or t o l l telephone c a l l s , telegrams, messenger service , 
f i e ld office expenses, and fees paid for securing approval of authorities having 
jurisdiction over the Project. 
1 .2 .1 Expense of al l reproduction, postage and handling of drawings, specif ications, 
reports or other Project-related instruments of service of the ENGINEER. 
1.2.4 Expense of computer time including charges for proprietary programs. 
1.2.5 Expense of preparing perspectives, renderings or models. 
ARTICLE 2. COMPENSATION 
I Invoicing Procedure 
CLIENT will be invoiced at U* end of the f i r s t calendar month following the ef fect ive 
date of this Agreement and at the end of each calendar month thereafter. Such invoices 
shall reflect bi l l ing for work performed by ENGINEER during the month invoiced. Payment 
on an invoice is due upon receipt of the invoice by CLIENT. In the event of a dispute 
regarding a b i l l ing , CLIENT shall pay a l l undisputed amounts as per this Article . 
2.2 Late Payment 
ENCIWFEK may assess a carrying charge of l . S percent per month on invoice amounts due and 
not paid within thirty (30) days of the date of invoice, which charge CLIENT warrants 
wil l he paid on demand. ENG1NFER aay, in i t s sole discretion, suspend or terminate I t s 
services under this Agreement should CLIENT not satisfy any amount invoiced within 
forty-f ive (4S) days of the date of invoice. ENGINEER further reserves the right to 
withhold any instruments of i t s serv ice , or copies thereof, from CLIENT on any project 
pending payment on CLIENT'S outstanding indebtedness. 
ARTICLE 3. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
3.1 Additional Services 
Services not expressly or implicit ly included with those herein specified, as determined 
by ENGINEER, are not covered by this Agreement. Such services may be provided only upon; 
execution of amendment in compliance with t h i s Agreement. 
*•* Termination for Cause 
This Agreement may be terminated by either party upon seven (7) days written notice 
should the other party fail substantially to perform in accordance with this Agreement 
through no fault of the party in i t iat ing the termination. 
*•* Termination Without Cause 
This Agreement may be terminated by CLIENT upon at least seven (7) days written notice to 
ENGINEER in the event that the Project i s permanently abandoned. 
\ Termination Adjustment; Payment 
If this Agreement is terminated through no fault of the ENGINEER, CLIENT shal l , upon 
'" r e v e s t , pay ENGINEER for services performed and Reimbursable Expenses incurred in accor-
dance with th is Agreement, plus a Termination Adjustment equalling fifteen percent ( ISt ) 
of the estimated fee remaining to be earned at the time of termination to account for 
ENGlNFER's rescheduling adjustments, reassignment of personnel and related costs Incurred 
due to termination. Should CLIENT so terminate this Agreement, ENGINEER reserves the 
right to complete such of i t s services and a report on tl»e services performed to date of 
termination to the extent that ENGINEER, in i t s sole judgment, deeas necessary to place 
Its f i l e s in order and/or to protect ENGINEER'S professional reputation, for which an 
additional termination charge to cover the cost thereof in an amount not in excess of 
thirty percent (301) of the charges incurred prior to the date of termination shall be 
paid by CLIENT upon ENGINEER'S request. 
*'* Construction Estimates 
Estimates of construction cost , material quantities and construction time estimates pro-
vided by ENGINEER under this Agreement are subject to change and are contingent upon fac-
tors over which ENGINEER has no control. ENGINEER does not guarantee the accuracy of 
such estimates. 
3.6 Limitation on Liabil ity 
CTTFNT l imits ENGlNFER's l i a b i l i t y to CLIENT, contractors, subcontractors and their 
agents, employees and consultants, which may arise from or be due direct ly or 
indirectly to the professional acts , errors and/or omissions of ENGINEER, i t s agents, 
employees or consultants such that ENGINEER'S aggregate l i a b i l i t y to such parties does 
not exceed ENGINEER'S fee or $ 50,000, whichever i s l e s s . CLIENT l imits ENGINEER'S l i a -
b i l i t y to a l l other third parties which may arise from or be due direct ly or indirectly 
to such acts , errors, and/or omissions such that ENGINEER'S tota'i aggregate l i a b i l i t y to 
a l l parties for such a c t s , errors and/or omissions does not exceed ENGINEER'S fee or $ 
SO,000. whichever i s greater. CLIENT limits ENGINEER'S l i a b i l i t y to CLIENT and al l third 
parties which may arise from or be due direct ly or Indirectly to ENGINEER'S 
non-professional a c t s , errors, or omissions such that ENGlNFER's total aggregate l ia -
b i l i t y to a l l parties for a l l ac t s , errors and/or omissions, professional or otherwise, 
does not exceed $ 100,000. CLIENT shall Indemnify ENGINEER, i t s agents, employees and 
.consultants for l i a b i l i t y in excess of the l imits stated herein. For purposes of 
computing l i a b i l i t y , l i a b i l i t y shall include defense costs and attorneys f ees . Prior tc 
the beginning of performance of services hereunder, these l imits may be increased up to 
ENGINEER'S then ef fect ive coverage limits upon CLIENT'S written request and agreement to 
pay an additional fee of 1/41 of the amount of any increase in coverage. 
3.7 Limited Warranty 
EWTIRTEK warrants that i t s findings, recommendations, specif icat ions or advice provided 
hereunder will be promulgated and prepared in accordance with the standards of the con-
sult ing engineering profession in Utah. ENGINEER makes no other warranty OT 
representation, express or implied, and CLIENT hereby expressly waives the same. Lia-
b i l i t y under th i s warranty i s expressly limited as per Section 3 .6 . 
3.8 Ownership of Documents 
All original tracings, notes, data and other documents are instruments of professional 
service and shall be the property of ENGINEER. Modification, or use on other projects, 
of such instruments of service, or copies thereof, without ENGINEER'S prior express 
written consent shall be at CLIENT'S sole risk. CLIENT shall hold harmless, indemnify 
and defend ENGINEER as to any and a l l claims arising out of any such nonpermissive modi-
f icat ion or use. 
3.9 CLIENT Information 
ENlTINEFE shall have the right to rely on any and a l l information supplied to ENGINEER by 
or through CLIENT or i t s representative, and shall not have a duty to verify the accuracy 
of such information' unless otherwise agreed herein. CLIENT shall hold harmless, 
* indemnify and defend ENGINEER as to any claims related, d irect ly or indirect ly , tc 
ENGINEER'S use of or reliance on any such information. 
ARTICLE 4. GENERAL TERNS AND CONDITIONS 
4.1 Applicable Law 
This Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced according to the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
4.2 Assignment: Subcontract ing 
Neither CLIENT nor UJuINEBt shall assign its Interest in this Agreement without the 
written consent of the other. ENGINEER may subcontract any portion of the work to be 
performed hereunder without such consent. 
4.3 Force Majeure 
Any delay or default in the performance of any obligation of e i ther party under this 
Agreement resulting from any cause(s) beyond said party's reasonable control , shall not 
be deemed a breach of th i s Agreement. The occurrence of any such event shall suspend 
the obligations of said party as long as performance i s delayed or prevented thereby. 
4.4 ^ joryy '^f*** 
CLIENT shall reimburse ENGINEER for any and al l costs incurred in the co l lect ion of 
* CLIENT'S overdue account, including reasonable attorney's f e e s . In the event that CLIENT 
unsuccessfully asserts a claim against ENGINEER, at law or otherwise, for any alleged 
a c t , error and/or omission, professional or otherwise, al leged to arise out of or be due 
d irect ly or Indirectly to ENGINEER'S performance of the professional services herefor 
contracted, CLIENT shall pay a l l costs , including reasonable attorney's f ee s , incurred by 
ENGDJEER or i t s assignee(s) or subrogee(s) in defending against said claim. 
4-S Severabil i ty; Waiver 
Tii tne event any provisions of this Agreement shal l be held to be invalid and 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain val id and binding upon the parties . 
One or more waiver of any term, condition or other provision of th i s Agreement by either 
party shall not be construed as a waiver of a subsequent breach of the same or any other 
provision. 
4.6 Amendments; Merger 
This Agreement may be amended only by written instrument expressly referring hereto and 
duly signed by the part ies . This Agreement const i tutes the entire and integrated agree-
ment between the parties hereto and supercedes a l l prior negot iat ions , representations 
and/or agreements, written or oral. 
